

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA  
COUNTY OF GREENVILLE

Fred W. "Trey" Suggs, III,

Plaintiff,

v.

Paul Hulseley, Cherie Durand, Kimberly  
Thomason, Devon Puriefoy, Desa  
Ballard,

Defendants.

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS  
THIRTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

**C.A. No. 2024-CP-23-03258**

**ORDER AND FINAL JUDGMENT**

This matter is before this Court as one of the damages hearings heard during the week of January 12, 2026. The hearing for Plaintiff Fred W. "Trey" Suggs, III ("Mr. Suggs") commenced on January 12, 2026, and concluded on January 13, 2026. Based on the record and evidence presented, this Court makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law:

**I. STATEMENT OF FACTS**

As Defendants Paul Hulseley, Cherie Durand, Kimberly Thomason, Devon Puriefoy, and Desa Ballard (collectively "Defendants") failed to timely file an Answer to the Amended Complaint, the facts as alleged in the Amended Complaint and restated below are admitted.

On May 17, 2024, Defendants sent a letter addressed to Mr. Suggs to Jennifer Browning, Browning Geriatrics, Tracy Parsons, Joseph Plaxco, Frank Plaxco, William Fore, Bon Secours Health System, Inc., St. Francis Physician Services, Inc., Tyler O'Shield, Carrie Woodall, and R. O'Neil Rabon (the "Defamatory Letter"). Defendants accused Mr. Suggs and the other recipients of the letter of participating in a scheme to

defraud Defendants' clients in violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1962, et. seq. ("RICO"). In addition, Defendants accused Mr. Suggs of engaging in a "Sham Probate Enterprise" consisting of a "pattern of racketeering activity." Defendants further accused Mr. Suggs of engaging in "multiple, repeated, and continuous" acts of mail fraud, wire fraud, and extortion as well as violations of South Carolina common law. Defendants allege Mr. Suggs committed these crimes through "comprehensive, multiple and inter-related schemes to deceive and defraud" which they assert can generally be understood as Mr. Suggs "knowingly self-dealing while committing fraud in the creation or administration of probated estates, settlements, trust agreements and property transactions while ignoring conflicts of interest and committing extortion. . . ." Further, Defendants allege that Mr. Suggs "use of the court system to advance the racketeering scheme is particularly egregious" because "it victimized the entire judicial system, impacts the administration of justice across the board and undermines the integrity of the legal process for everyone."

## II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On May 24, 2024, Mr. Suggs filed a Summons and Complaint against Defendants in the Greenville County Court of Common Pleas for South Carolina. Thereafter, on July 12, 2024, Mr. Suggs filed an Amended Complaint against Defendants asserting claims for libel, libel *per se*, and civil conspiracy. Defendants were duly served and filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure ("SCRCP"). On October 3, 2024, Judge Salvini issued a Form 4 Order denying the motion to dismiss. On October 14, 2024, Defendants filed a Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment under Rule 59(e), SCRCP. On October 29, 2024, Judge Salvini issued a briefing schedule

on Defendants' Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment under Rule 59(e), SCRPC. Thereafter, on November 27, 2024, Judge Salvini denied Defendants' Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment. Defendants' Answer to Mr. Suggs' Amended Complaint was due on October 18, 2024. However, Defendants did not file their Answer until November 12, 2024.

On October 28, 2024, counsel for Mr. Suggs filed an affidavit requesting that the Court enter default against the Defendants under Rule 55, SCRPC. On November 4, 2024, Defendants filed a Petition to the Chief Justice of the South Carolina Supreme Court seeking the recusal of Judge Salvini. On November 12, 2024, Mr. Suggs filed a motion for default judgment pursuant to Rule 55(b) and requested a damages hearing. On November 18, 2024, the Defendants filed their Objection and Motion to Set Aside Entry of Default. On December 27, 2024, Defendants filed an appeal of Judge Salvini's order with an amended appeal following on December 30, 2024. The South Carolina Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal on January 6, 2025. On January 16, 2025, Defendants filed a Motion to Reinstate the Appeal which was subsequently denied on April 17, 2025. On February 11, 2025, Defendants filed a Supplemental Petition to the Chief Justice of the South Carolina Supreme Court. On February 13, 2025, the Chief Justice issued an Order assigning this matter and the other related matters (*Rabon v. Hulsey*, Case No: 2024CP2303236; *Jennings v. Hulsey*, Case No.: 2024CP2303271; *Plaxco v. Hulsey*, Case No.: 2024CP2303329; *Browning v. Hulsey*, Case No.: 2024CP2303730) to Judge Griffith for further handling.

On April 4, 2025, this Court issued a Form 4 Order granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Entry of Default and denying Defendants' Motion to Set Aside the Entry of Default with a

more detailed Order following on April 17, 2025. On April 28, 2025, Defendants filed a Motion for Reconsideration and to Alter or Amend this Order. On July 10, 2025, Defendants filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings or in the Alternative for a Stay. On July 30, 2025, Defendants filed a Motion to Bifurcate these proceedings. On August 18, 2025, Defendant Durand filed a Motion to Vacate the Order of Entry of Default and Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Substitute.

On January 12, 2026, this Court held a damages hearing for this case during which evidence was presented of the damages suffered by Mr. Suggs as a result of the Defamatory Letter. This Court also heard argument on Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, Defendants' Motion for Reconsideration or to Alter and Amend, and Plaintiffs' Motion for Sanctions. The Court denied Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and Motion for Reconsideration or to Alter and Amend and took under advisement Plaintiffs' Motion for Sanctions. In addition, this Court was advised that Defendants Cherie Durand and Paul Hulsey or the Estate of Paul Hulsey reached a resolution with Plaintiffs prior to the hearings. As such, any motions filed on their behalf still pending were denied as moot.

### **III. EVIDENCE PRESENTED**

Mr. Suggs called the following three witnesses to testify regarding damages: S. Blakely Smith ("Mr. Smith"), V. Clark Price ("Mr. Price"), and Mr. Suggs. This Court also considered following exhibits, which were entered as evidence in the case: (1) Michalski Defamatory Letter; (2) Grist Defamatory Letter; (3) Schnabel Defamatory Letter; (4) EPOCH Times Article; (5) Bon Secours Revenue for 2023-2025; (6) Nelson Mullins Statement of Attorney's Fees; (7) Damages Summary; (8) Article on Mr. Suggs Receiving

Worthy Adversary Award; (9) Article on Mr. Suggs being named in Greenville 2025 Top Lawyers List; (10) Article on Mr. Suggs being named Best Lawyers in America 2026; (11) Article on Mr. Suggs being included in SC Lawyers Weekly Medical Malpractice Law Power List 2024; (12) Article on Mr. Suggs being included in SC Lawyers Weekly Medical Malpractice Law Power List 2025; (13) Defendant Thomason's Deposition Excerpts; (14) Defendant Thomason's Deposition Transcript; (15) Defendant Puriefoy's Deposition Excerpts; (16) Defendant Puriefoy's Deposition Transcript; (17) Defendant Ballard's Deposition Excerpts; (18) Defendant Ballard's Deposition Transcript; (19) Affidavit of Paul Hulsey; (20) 2025.09.26 Petition to Open Hulsey's Estate; (21) 2025.10.21 Amended Petition to Open Hulsey's Estate; (22) 2025.09.26 Return Letter from Probate Court; (23) Paul Hulsey's Death Certificate; and (24) Deposition video clips.

Mr. Smith is the managing partner of Parham, Smith, and Archenhold, LLC where he has practiced for over twenty-five (25) years. Mr. Smith primarily represents plaintiffs in medical malpractice cases. Mr. Smith regularly handles cases in which Mr. Suggs is opposing counsel. He testified regarding his experience with Mr. Suggs and his reputation as a lawyer as well as the importance of a lawyer's reputation among other lawyers, judges, and in the marketplace. His testimony was that reputation is critical to a lawyer's success, and that reputational harm once inflicted is extraordinarily difficult – if not impossible – to repair. He testified that Mr. Suggs has an excellent reputation and has always been courteous, professional, and honest in his experience. In his view, Mr. Suggs is one of the premier medical malpractice defense lawyers in South Carolina.

Based on his knowledge of the Defamatory Letter and the allegations contained in it, Mr. Smith testified that, though he personally did not believe the allegations against Mr.

Suggs, he acknowledged that such allegations were serious and very likely to irreparably harm Mr. Suggs' reputation.

Mr. Price is a partner at Cassidy Coates Price, P.A., and has practiced law for more than forty (40) years. He has known Mr. Suggs from the time he was a law clerk through Mr. Suggs' advancement to equity partner at Cassidy Coates Price, P.A. He testified about his knowledge regarding Mr. Suggs' excellent reputation in the Greenville County and South Carolina legal communities, as reflected by the numerous professional honors and awards Mr. Suggs has received from both colleagues and adversaries. Specifically, Mr. Price testified that Mr. Suggs has participated in and held various leadership positions in the South Carolina Bar and the South Carolina Defense Trial Attorneys' Association. Further, Mr. Suggs is a member of the American Board of Trial Advocates, which is an invitation only organization for trial lawyers who represent plaintiffs and defendants. In addition to his participation in legal organizations, Mr. Suggs received the Worthy Adversary Award from the South Carolina Trial Lawyers Association and was named to the Greenville 2025 Top Lawyers List, Best Lawyers in America for 2026, and the South Carolina Lawyers Weekly Medical Malpractice Power List for 2024 and 2025.

Mr. Price also testified as to when he first became aware of the Defamatory Letter and his reaction to the allegations made against Mr. Suggs. He testified that one of the first steps he took after learning of the letter was to review the file of *Michalski v. Bon Secours*, Civil Action No. 2017CP2304295 (S.C. Ct. Comm. Pleas 2017) to determine whether there was any factual basis for the allegations. He explained that the lawsuit was a wrongful death action brought on behalf of the Estate of Frances Michalski in which Mr. Suggs represented the defendants which included Bon Secours Health Systems, Inc.

Based on his review, Mr. Price concluded Mr. Suggs properly defended the firm's clients and that he found no conduct that could have supported the allegations set forth in the Defamatory Letter. Further, Mr. Suggs' role in the lawsuit was limited to the wrongful death action, and he was not involved in underlying probate court proceedings involving the Estate of Frances Michalski, which appears to be the subject the Defamatory Letter.

Mr. Price testified about his observations of Mr. Suggs and how he has been forced to respond to the consequences of the Defamatory Letter. He explained that the Defamatory Letter was of particular concern because two of its recipients were the firm's largest clients—Bon Secours Health Systems, Inc. and St. Francis Physician Services, Inc. He credited Mr. Suggs for these entities becoming significant clients of the firm and emphasized the importance of them to the firm. Should the firm lose either client because of the allegations in the Defamatory Letter, he testified it would have had a substantial negative financial impact on the firm.

Finally, Mr. Price testified that the allegations in the Defamatory Letter were common knowledge among the lawyers in the Greenville Bar and general public. For example, he was confronted at a status conference unrelated to this case about an article published by The EPOCH Times which references the allegations contained in the Defamatory Letter. In this article, Mr. Suggs is alleged to be associated with a "Sham Probate Enterprise," which is a phrase that also appears in the Defamatory Letter.

Mr. Suggs also testified at this hearing. He is a partner at Cassidy Coates Price, P.A., who concentrates his practice on defending hospitals and medical professionals. Mr. Suggs testified regarding the personal and professional impact the Defamatory Letter has had on him since it was circulated. He testified that he did not receive the letter directly

but learned of it through one of its other recipients, Joseph Plaxco. Mr. Suggs testified he has been asked about the allegations in the Defamatory Letter from numerous colleagues – both known and unknown to him. He testified he was aware of the EPOCH Times article and its reference to his association with a “Sham Probate Enterprise.” To the best of his knowledge, Mr. Suggs stated the EPOCH Times article has a distribution list of millions of individuals and is circulated internationally. Personally, Mr. Suggs explained that it has been difficult to be confronted about the contents of the Defamatory Letter by his family, friends, fellow church members, and other individuals within his community. Mr. Suggs addressed the allegations contained in the letter, explaining that they were false and without any factual basis. He also testified about the *Michalski v. Bon Secours*, Civil Action No. 2017CP2304295 (S.C. Ct. Comm. Pleas 2017) lawsuit and his role in that case. Mr. Suggs confirmed that he does not practice in probate court and was not involved in any of the probate court proceedings for the Estate of Frances Michalski.

In addition to the fact that the Defamatory Letter accused Mr. Suggs of committing felonies, Mr. Suggs testified the Defamatory Letter was also of great concern because it presented a substantial risk to his relationship with Bon Secours Health System, Inc.—his firm’s largest client. Mr. Suggs’ testified that the revenue generated by these clients is significant and the loss of their business would be devastating to his firm. Following Bon Secours Health System, Inc.’s receipt of the Defamatory Letter, Mr. Suggs was required to meet with lawyers in the general counsel’s office and members of the risk management department. Fortunately, he convinced them, at least for now, not to withdraw their business from his firm because the allegations in the Defamatory Letter are completely false and baseless.

Mr. Suggs also testified regarding the economic damages he has incurred as a result of the Defamatory Letter and this litigation. Mr. Suggs spent a considerable amount of time dealing with the Defamatory Letter which he estimated to be approximately one hundred and fifty (150) hours. His average billable rate is four hundred fifteen and 00/100ths dollars (\$415.00) which equates to a total of sixty-two thousand two hundred fifty and 00/100ths dollars (\$62,250.00) of lost time. He has also observed a reduction in the amount of revenue received from Bon Secours Health Systems, Inc. since it received the Defamatory Letter totaling approximately one hundred forty-four thousand eight hundred thirty-three and 76/100ths dollars (\$144,833.76). In total, Mr. Suggs testified that his economic damages total approximately four hundred ninety-six thousand seven hundred fifty-one and 29/100ths dollars (\$496,751.29). This amount is also reflected in Mr. Suggs' Economic Damages Summary, which was entered into evidence as Exhibit Seven during the hearing. Mr. Suggs testified he is also seeking noneconomic damages, which the law presumes for accusations of felonies.

#### IV. LEGAL AUTHORITY

"It is well settled that by suffering a default, the defaulting party is deemed to have admitted the truth of the plaintiff's allegations and to have conceded liability." *Roche v. Young Bros., Inc., of Florence*, 332 S.C. 75, 81, 504 S.E.2d 311, 314 (1998). "In a default case, the plaintiff must prove by competent evidence the amount of his damages, and such proof must be by a preponderance of the evidence." *Jackson v. Midlands Human Res. Ctr.*, 296 S.C. 526, 529, 374 S.E.2d 505, 506 (Ct. App. 1988). However, in an action for libel *per se*, common law malice and general damages are presumed. *Erickson v. Jones Street Publishers, LLC*, 368 S.C. 444, 629 S.E.2d 653, 664 (2006). "When a

defamatory statement is actionable *per se*, the plaintiff need not prove general damages—as these damages are presumed—and the defendant is presumed to have acted with common law malice.” *Kunst v. Loree*, 424 S.C. 24, 39, 817 S.E.2d 295, 302–03 (Ct. App. 2018).

Under South Carolina law, a defamation plaintiff must demonstrate clear and convincing evidence of actual malice to warrant an award of punitive damages. *Tharp v. Media General, Inc.*, 987 F. Supp. 2d 673 (D.S.C. 2013) citing *Hainer v. Am. Med. Int'l, Inc.*, 328 S.C. 128, 135, 492 S.E.2d 103, 107 n.8 (1997) (“We remind trial judges that in cases in which the issue of punitive damages is submitted to the jury, there must be clear and convincing evidence of actual malice to warrant such an award.”); *see also* S.C. Code Ann. § 15-33-135; *see also Miller v. City of West Columbia*, 322 S.C. 224, 471 S.E.2d 683 (1996) (awarding \$500,000 punitive damages in defamation case); *Kelley v. Wren*, 415 S.C. 379, 782 S.E.2d 406 (Ct. App. 2016) (awarding \$250,000 in punitive damages in libel case).

In determining the award of damages in this case, this Court also relied in part on the following defamation cases. In *Sulka v. Hoagland*, Case No. 2017-CP-07-01547, the plaintiff who was serving as the Mayor of Bluffton brought a defamation action against the defendant after the defendant circulated emails to Chamber of Commerce members accusing her of misusing public funds, engaging in criminal conduct, and being unfit for office. A jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff in the amount of \$40,000,000 in actual damages and \$10,000,000 in punitive damages.

Further, in *Kellie and Kayla Bingham v. Medical University of South Carolina*, Case No. 2016-CP-08-013, plaintiffs brought an action for defamation alleging they were falsely

accused of cheating on an exam which led to their expulsion. Based on these facts, a jury awarded each plaintiff \$750,000.00.

Similarly, in *Kunst v. Loree*, 424 S.C. 24, 817 S.E.2d 295 (Ct. App. 2018), a jury awarded the plaintiff \$1,000,000.00 in actual damages after the defendant falsely accused the plaintiff of embezzlement, creating false invoices, and other criminal acts that harmed his reputation and business. The South Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the verdict.

## **V. DAMAGES**

Based on the evidence presented and the law on defamation *per se* in South Carolina, this Court awards the following damages: (1) economic damages; (2) damages *per se*; and (3) punitive damages.

### **1. Economic Damages**

Mr. Suggs established he has suffered lost billable time and that there has been a noticeable reduction in revenue from Bon Secours Health Systems, Inc. Mr. Suggs also testified that he has lost a significant amount of billable time equating to approximately sixty-two thousand two hundred fifty and 00/100ths dollars (\$62,250.00). Further, following Bon Secours Health System, Inc.'s receipt of the Defamatory Letter, Mr. Suggs testified that he has seen a reduction in revenue from Bon Secours of approximately one hundred forty-four thousand eight hundred thirty-three and 76/100ths dollars (\$144,833.76). Because the applicable statute of limitations is three (3) years, the total amount of lost revenue that Mr. Suggs could suffer and also recover for the Defamatory Letter is four hundred thirty-four thousand five hundred one and 29/100ths dollars (\$434,501.29).

Therefore, Mr. Suggs has presented sufficient evidence to establish economic damages in the amount of four hundred ninety-six thousand seven hundred fifty-one and 29/100ths dollars (\$496,751.29).

## **2. Damages Per Se**

Because this case involves admitted allegations of libel *per se*, Mr. Suggs was not required to prove general damages. “When a defamatory statement is actionable *per se*, the plaintiff need not prove general damages—as these damages are presumed—and the defendant is presumed to have acted with common law malice.” *Kunst v. Loree*, 424 S.C. 24, 39, 817 S.E.2d 295, 302–03 (Ct. App. 2018). Thus, Mr. Suggs’ noneconomic damages are those that the law presumes as a result of Defendants accusing Mr. Suggs of committing felonies in written correspondence.

Through multiple witnesses, Mr. Suggs presented compelling testimony regarding the importance of a lawyer’s reputation to professional success, the reliance placed on that reputation by courts, clients, and fellow attorneys, and the extraordinary difficulty of repairing reputational harm once inflicted. Further, Mr. Suggs established his reputation within the legal community is as a well-respected attorney held in high regard by both colleagues and clients.

Moreover, as the defamatory statements were in writing and transmitted to multiple recipients without any limitation on third-party access or republication, Mr. Suggs’ presented evidence that the harm to his reputation extended beyond the legal community. Mr. Price, Mr. Smith, and Mr. Suggs each testified as to their knowledge of an article published in the EPOCH Times which identifies Mr. Suggs and associates him with the Sham Probate Enterprise referenced in the Defamatory Letter.

The witnesses' testimony regarding the importance of a lawyer's reputation was compelling. It affects his/her relationship with other lawyers and with the Court. Also, it affects client relationships and the success of a lawyer's practice. The false and malicious accusations in the Defamatory Letter are the basis of a significant monetary award against the Defendants. This is especially true where no justification or explanation was offered for repeated accusations of felonies against Mr. Suggs.

The defense averred during cross examination that the Plaintiffs, individually and collectively, could not prove the damages were caused solely by the letters and not the actual lawsuits. The Court takes judicial notice that the RICO cases were dismissed in favor of Mr. Suggs. Though the Defendants suggest that the federal case dismissal minimizes the harm done to the Plaintiffs, the Court finds this assertion unjustified. Defendants created the harm when they circulated the letters. The harm has continued, and it has not ebbed notwithstanding the dismissal of the RICO cases in favor Mr. Suggs.

Because the statements at issue constitute libel *per se*, Mr. Suggs is entitled to damages presumed at law. Therefore, this Court awards Mr. Suggs four million five hundred three thousand two hundred forty-eight and 71/100ths dollars (\$4,503,248.71). Including Mr. Suggs' economic damages, this Court awards Mr. Suggs a total of five million and 00/100ths dollars (\$5,000,000.00) in actual damages.

### **3. Punitive Damages**

The last issue for consideration before this Court is the amount of punitive damages that Mr. Suggs has proven he is entitled to. See *Hainer v. Am. Med. Int'l, Inc.*, 328 S.C. 128, 135 n.8, 492 S.E.2d 103, 107 n.8 (1997) ("We remind trial judges that in cases in which the issue of punitive damages is submitted to the jury, there must be clear

and convincing evidence of actual malice to warrant such an award.”). Here, the evidence establishes actual malice by clear and convincing evidence. Defendants accused Mr. Suggs of committing multiple crimes, including wire fraud, mail fraud, extortion, and perjury without any factual basis. In the Defamatory Letter, Defendants expressly acknowledged the gravity of their accusations, stating that they were “aware of the serious nature of the charges and the impact they may have upon business operations,” yet claimed they were “completely confident in the position [they had] taken.” This Court takes particular note of the fact that, in the Defamatory Letter which forms the basis of Mr. Suggs’ claim, Defendants acknowledge the damage that this letter would cause. Their acknowledgement is clear evidence of intentional conduct done with the purpose of harming Mr. Suggs and the other recipients. It is rare to have Defendants openly admit their intent to harm, but that is precisely what has occurred here, as evidenced by the language in the Defamatory Letter.

Notwithstanding their admitted awareness of the severe and potentially devastating consequences of their allegations, Defendants then deliberately transmitted the Defamatory Letter to multiple recipients without regard to third-party access or republication. Their choice to transmit the Defamatory Letter to multiple recipients, one of which is a client of Mr. Suggs, without an initial telephone call or report to the South Carolina bar supports a finding that the Defamatory Letter was sent for an improper and malicious purpose.

Moreover, Defendants’ conduct during discovery further reinforces this conclusion. During their depositions, Defendants repeatedly refused to answer even the most basic questions concerning the Defamatory Letter—at times doing so despite express

instructions from their own counsel to respond. This obstruction materially impeded Mr. Suggs' ability to obtain relevant evidence for the damages hearings and reflects not only disregard for these proceedings and the Rules of Civil Procedure but a level of willful obstruction that is particularly egregious when committed by licensed attorneys.

In light of this pattern of disregard for the truth, discovery obligations, and the integrity of the judicial proceedings, in evaluating the appropriate measure of punitive damages, the deterrence factor carries particular weight. In this unique set of circumstances, where the actors are lawyers whose conduct exhibits disrespect for the truth, the obligations in discovery, a sitting Circuit Court judge, and for the reputation of an outstanding member of the South Carolina bar, punitive damages are appropriate and necessary to ensure that such behavior is not repeated, either by these Defendants or by others. Therefore, this Court finds Mr. Suggs has presented clear and convincing evidence of actual malice intended to harm Mr. Suggs to warrant a punitive damages award of two million five hundred thousand and 00/100ths dollars (\$2,000,000.00)<sup>1</sup> against Defendants.

## VI. CONCLUSION

It is hereby ORDERED that Mr. Suggs have judgment as follows:

- a. Actual damages against Defendants Devan Puriefoy, Kimberly Thomason, and Desa Ballard, jointly and severally in the amount of **\$5,000,000.00** and
- b. Punitive damages are hereby ordered against Defendant Devon Puriefoy in the amount of **\$666,666.67**.

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<sup>1</sup> The Court calculates the award of punitive damages as a percentage of the actual damages. The Court utilized a 40% rate to calculate the award. (40% of \$5,000,000.00 equals \$2,000,000.00)

- c. Punitive damages are hereby ordered against Defendant Kimberly Thomason in the amount of \$666,666.67.
- d. Punitive damages are hereby ordered against Defendant Desa Ballard in the amount of \$666,666.67.

These amounts shall be subject to post-judgment interest at the rate of eleven and a half (11.50%) per annum.

**IT IS SO ORDERED.**

This \_\_\_ day of \_\_\_\_\_, 2026

\_\_\_\_\_  
Eugene C. Griffith, Jr.  
Presiding Circuit Judge

FITSNEWS



Greenville Common Pleas

**Case Caption:** Fred W Trey Suggs III vs. Paul Hulsey , defendant, et al

**Case Number:** 2024CP2303258

**Type:** Order/Other

It is so ordered

Eugene C. Griffith, Jr. 2154

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